Rather, a constitutional intention can be incorporated in an ongoing process of constitutional change, albeit—as maybe in the case of Brexit—with a serious swerving effect. With regard to this body of law, s. In this sense, there is a prima facie argument in favour of their legitimacy. I can only be schematic here. We can see this at play with the Brexit vote. Instead, through constitutional identity, a dialogical exchange in constitutional terms serves to strengthen the interdependence between the national and supranational legal orders at Schmitt is right to detect a core political choice in constitutions and to say that this core choice is what makes a constitution.

But the negative effect also takes place at the level of member-states: This keys in with the dualistic doctrine of British law regarding international law: If respect for the constitutional identity of the Member States can thus constitute a legitimate interest which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by Community law, it can all the more be relied upon by a Member State to justify its assessment of constitutional measures which must supplement Community legislation in order to ensure observance, on its territory, of the principles and rules laid down by or underlying that legislation. This face off explains why, whatever may happen in the future, Brexit cannot be a full success. I can only be schematic here. This ambivalence stems from two ideal types of constitutionalism:

Yet I am far from claiming that the leave vote, or any other significant act of will following it, is actually a constitutional decision, for reasons I will explain dssertation. They cannot be easily dismissed by theories of constitutional law that claim to be democratic in the modern sense. There remained the question of how to take into account this political normativity in legal terms.

The first part treats constitutional identity as a norm of resistance. What matters ee fact is that the vote has an inherent importance, a normative authority which is not adequately captured by just apprehending the fact that, on the face of it, it was not legally binding on Parliament.


Yet this decision is so self-evident that it is difficult for politicians or observers to spell out its exact consequences. The truth in them is overstated. Of course, there are also counterforces.

Brexit as a Constitutional Decision: An Interpretation

Yet the locus of the constitutional decision in terms of source or instrumentum and the very content, in precise legal terms, of what was decided is hugely vague. In his dissenting opinion, Lord Reed states that the Miller litigation is not. There seems to be at least an adticle, in the mind of politicians, that referenda will lend some degree of legitimacy to a constitutional reform.

The central tenet of his work aims at constructing a bridge between those insisting on the absolute primacy of Consttiution law on the one hand, and the more pluralist scholarship on the other hand. With the benefit of hindsight, and for various reasons, it is fair to say that none of this has happened.

Indeed, his analysis of Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein shows that the CJEU defers to a national conception of human rights, in part inspired by a specific national cultural background at — This decision amounts to a deliberate choice to not have a constitution. Brexit reads as a reaction against —or a rejection of— globalism: As Millet notes, the closer the national restriction justified with national constitutional identity touches upon the core values of the EU, such as the principle of non-discrimination, the less likely the CJEU is to accept this justification.

There are many ways to approach Brexit. This is why constituent power can be reconciled with representation. Conseil constitutionnel, Decision nr. This theme is subjacent to the new series edited by Monica Claes with Hart Publishing: Direct European Union legislation, so far as operative immediately before exit day, forms part of domestic law on and after exit day.


But the Schmittian political philosophy seems to fit well with their own—less articulate, to say the least—ideology.

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That populist and nationalist —anti-globalization— projects do not appear eissertation far as being successful beyond their electoral success in some countries may be evidence that they set the autonomy claim at consttution wrong level.

The implications of this fact are wide-ranging and go beyond the purview of the present article. Millet connects this position of ordered pluralism to the theories of Miguel Poiares Maduro 32 and Matthias Kumm at33 Maduro has developed a discursive approach to pluralism, suggesting that the constitutional reasoning by both European and national courts should be constructively engaged with one another.

article 88-1 de la constitution dissertation

In other words, the ECA is only a conduit pipe: See his brief pro the economic regulation of labor hours of women in Muller v. It is, nevertheless, necessary to point out that that respect owed to the constitutional identity of the Member States cannot be understood as artice absolute obligation to defer to all national constitutional rules.

article 88-1 de la constitution dissertation

The backlog of European Union law will be there for a long time. They need to be addressed raticle. In any case, the normative legacy of thirty-five years of British adhesion to the EC and the European Union will remain massive.

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I do not refute it either. The Italian Government and the court making the reference.

article 88-1 de la constitution dissertation

The essence of a legal-technocratic order is to thwart political decision:

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